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Abstract: This study investigates the change in Conservative Party behaviour
during the 18 months between the 2004 and 2006 Canadian federal elections. It
asks: How did the Conservative Party strategy influence the shift in voter pref-
erence during the 2006 Canadian federal election? The approach taken to
address this question is rooted in the emerging field of Political Marketing.
Using the Lees-Marshment taxonomy of party behaviour as a framework for
analyzing the election outcome, this paper demonstrates how market intelli-
gence was incorporated into the Conservative Party’s strategy to influence voter
perceptions.
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Résumé : La recherche porte sur les changements de comportement du Parti con-
servateur pendant les 18 mois entre les élections fédérales de 2004 et de 2006.
La question posée est la suivante : Comment la stratégie du parti conservateur
a influencé l’évolution du vote pendant la campagne électorale fédérale de
2006 ? Pour y répondre, nous avons choisi une approche qui relève du champ
émergent des recherches en marketing politique. En utilisant la taxonomie du
comportement d’un parti de Lees-Marshment en tant que cadre théorique pour
analyser les résultats de l’élection, nous souhaitons démontrer de quelle façon
l’intelligence du marché a été intégrée dans la communication politique du Parti
conservateur afin d’influencer les perceptions des électeurs et électrices.
Mots clés : Politique et medias, Marketing, Relations publiques
Introduction
In October 2003 the Canadian Alliance Party (CAP) and the Progressive
Conservative Party (PCP) merged into the Conservative Party of Canada (CPC).
Five months later, in March 2004, Stephen Harper, the former leader of the CAP
was chosen to lead the new national party. Some three months after that, on
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June 28, 2004, Canada’s 38th general election took place. In contrast to the ini-
tial expectations of many commentators, the 2004 election proved to be a closely
contested affair between the newly formed CPC and the governing Liberals.1 The
outcome of the election saw the Liberal Party re-elected to power but losing its
parliamentary majority in the wake of a $100-million Liberal sponsorship scan-
dal, or Adscam, revealed in the annual report of the Auditor General, Sheila
Fraser, earlier in the year.
While the total number of seats in the House of Commons won by the
Conservatives in 2004 grew from 78 to 99, the new party’s share of the popular
vote fell to 29.6% from the 37.7% that had been jointly obtained by the CAP and
PCP in 2000 (Elections Canada, 2007). The decline in popular support for the
Conservatives in 2004 was linked to the Canadian public’s apprehension about the
new party and its leader, and to a Liberal Party public communication campaign
that successfully played upon this apprehension. The campaign portrayed the CPC
and its leader as untrustworthy and harbouring a hidden right-wing agenda ori-
ented toward curtailing public services and fostering closer ties with the Bush
Administration (Clarke, Kornberg, MacLeod, & Scotto, 2005; Rose, 2004).
In January 2006, Canadians returned to the polls. Despite the fact that many
of the central issues in the 2006 election echoed those of the 2004 campaign
(Clarke et al., 2005; Clarke, Kornberg, Scotto, & Twyman, 2006), this time the
Conservatives’ share of the popular vote grew by approximately 7% to 36.3%, and
the CPC was elected to power as a minority government (Elections Canada, 2007).
This victory suggests that in the 18 months between the two federal elections, the
CPC managed to successfully reconfigure itself and its political communication
strategy in a manner that enhanced its appeal to the Canadian electorate.
A central communication question that arises is How did the Conservative
Party strategy influence the shift in voter preference during the 2006 Canadian
federal election? In tackling this issue our discussion draws upon the political
marketing framework proposed by Lees-Marshment (2001a, 2001b, 2006) and
Lilleker and Lees-Marshment (2005a) to examine the organizational strategies
adopted by the CPC to engage with the Canadian electorate in the period between
the 2004 and 2006 federal elections. Although this framework was developed as
an analytical construct for examining the rise of “New” Labour in the United
Kingdom during the 1990s, it has more recently been used within the interna-
tional context to analyze the behaviour of political parties in different national
contexts, including Austria, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Ireland, New Zealand,
Peru, Scotland, Sweden, and the United States.2
Two distinguishing features underpin the Lees-Marshment framework. The
first is the notion that, just as contemporary producers of goods and services need
to increasingly generate customized goods/services to effectively connect with con-
sumers, modern political parties in liberal democracies need to alter the ways in
which they deliver their product offerings (e.g., party platforms, party and leader
image) to their consumers (i.e., voters) to effectively connect with the electorate.
The second is the emphasis placed on organizational strategy and positioning
in the political marketplace. The Lees-Marshment framework challenges the
commonly held view that political marketing is primarily about tactical campaign
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issues (e.g., image advertising, branding) and the use of sales techniques during
campaigns. Instead it postulates that political marketing is, fundamentally, about
organizational behaviour and the design of political products. The “products” are
seen to be comprised, foremost, of intangibles such as how a political party per-
forms in terms of its leadership, Members of Parliament and candidates, member-
ship, staff, symbols, constitution, and its activities such as party conferences and
policies. Therefore, this framework is not oriented toward comparing “the selling
of politics with cornflakes, to use the old cliché, but with the selling of long-term
services in mature markets” (Scammell, 1999, p. 726).
Seen in this light, the political communication and, more broadly, the media
strategies of political parties are understood as constituting part of a political
organization’s overall market orientation. In order to illuminate the relationship
between the type of organization behind campaigns and the strategies of the cam-
paigns, the Lees-Marshment framework puts forth three—ideal—typologies to
distinguish between party strategies: product-, sales- and marketing-oriented
organizations.
The argument developed in the ensuing pages is that, by combining the desire
of political science to understand political processes with the interest of political
communication in the use of persuasive messages to reach audiences, the Lees-
Marshment framework provides a useful addition to the arsenal of tools at our
disposal for understanding and assessing the organizational strategies used by
political parties in liberal democracies to interact with and to understand the
expressed and latent desires, needs, and priorities of the electorate. The next sec-
tion provides an overview of the changing dynamics of citizenship and of the
foundations of the emerging field of Political Marketing. The third section pres-
ents a case study of the Conservative Party’s political marketing strategy in the
period between the 2004 and 2006 elections. The focus of the case study is on the
ways in which market intelligence was incorporated into and shaped the
Conservative Party’s organizational strategy. The last section draws out the impli-
cations of the case study.
Market, media, and citizen-consumers
Domestic and international political arenas are influenced by intense social and
cultural pressures that constantly challenge the conceptual frameworks developed
by social scientists to analyze the domain of political communication. Maarek
(1995), for example, has argued that political communication can no longer con-
tinue to rely on the rhetorical quality of the political discourse of its orators.
Similarly, Blumler and Kavanagh (1999) and Blumler and Gurevitch (2000)
claim that we have entered into a “third age” of political communication that is
characterized by an abundance of information and consumption choices that are
transforming the political domain and which require new forms of information
exchange between governments and citizens.
A defining feature of this third age of political communication, according to
Scammell (2003) and Bennett (n.d.), is the consolidation of a market relation
between citizens and the political sphere. Echoing the views of Mouffe (1992),
Bauböck (1994), and Sassen (2002), they suggest that the expansion of competi-
tion and choice in the provision of, and access to, information services has altered
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the landscape of citizenship such that it is no longer realized only in people’s rela-
tion to the state. Elaborating on this phenomenon, Scammell (2003, p. 15) argues:
Clearly, there are parallels in the development of consumer and political
markets. Just as the consumer is empowered through increased choice
and vastly expanded resources of information, so too is the political con-
sumer. Political interest options and resources await our convenience in
astonishing abundance. . . . The political consumer is increasingly the
hunter rather than the hunted. In politics as in commerce there is a shift
in the balance of market power from the producers to the consumers.
The result, she claims, is a convergence of citizenship and consumerism in
the North American and European contexts and a reshaping of citizens into a
political “audience” that now asserts its structural power on the basis of a con-
sumerist mantle instead of class. The empowerment of citizens under this mantle,
she further argues, is observable in the growing demands for more direct, and bet-
ter-delivered, benefits in public services that frequently are based on voter’s pri-
mary and/or short-term interests.
Within the Canadian context, the notion of political consumers is exemplified,
in part, by the presence of a political environment in which it is difficult to sustain
party loyalty among the electorate and in which voters tend to eschew strong ide-
ological affiliations (Clarke, Jenson, LeDuc, & Pammett, 1996).3 According to
Carty (2002, p. 727), the Canadian electorate’s multi-partisanship corresponds to
the idiosyncrasies of the Canadian political system and context insofar as
[p]arliamentary norms call for a level of party discipline on policy and
programme questions that simply make it impossible to contain all of the
country’s political diversity within two parties. Regions that feel neg-
lected and groups who think their interests are not being articulated find
themselves drawn to build and support new parties.
Multiculturalism also contributes to voter instability insofar as “immigration
has added a higher proportion of voters with no established party ties to the elec-
torate than in any other established democracy” (Carty, 2002, p. 727). It also may
be argued that the reshaping of citizens into a political audience within the
Canadian context is evidenced by the propensity for the short-term forces associ-
ated with valence issues4 and leader images to play such a prominent role in vot-
ers’ decision-making (Blais, Gidengil, Nadeau, & Nevitte, 2002; Clarke et al.,
1996; Clarke, Kornberg, & Wearing, 2000). In light of this situation, Canadian
political parties must contend with finding ways to communicate effectively with
diverse and irregular supporters who often are animated by the interests and
demands of their distinctive communities, regions, and cultural groups.
Advertising and selling techniques have long been incorporated into the
modus operandi of political communication (Butler & Collins, 1994; Hacker &
Swan, 1992; Kern, 1989). This may help to explain why political marketing is
commonly equated with elections, advertising techniques, and, more broadly, the
media strategies employed by political organizations in the quest for electoral
mandates (Scammell, 1999). Niffenegger (1989), for example, has argued that the
implementation of marketing strategies in the political domain is a process aimed
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at offering a more effective and efficient means of designing and implementing
political campaigns. In line with this view, Maarek (1995) conceptualizes politi-
cal marketing as a complex process that encapsulates advertising, message
design, public opinion polls, positioning, and branding. O’Cass (1996) similarly
argues that, while political marketing cannot ensure electoral success, “it does
offer improved performance, and more appropriate ways of making decisions and
managing campaigns” (p. 40).
Lees-Marshment (2001a, 2001b, 2006) and Lilleker & Lees-Marshment
(2005a), by contrast, call for a merging of political communication’s traditional
concern with elections, advertising techniques, and media strategy, with a focus
on the behaviour of political organizations during and between elections.
Expanding on this view, Lees-Marshment (2001a, p. 701) points out that
[c]ampaign studies suggest the importance of campaigns; political com-
munication and media studies highlight the role of long-term communi-
cation. The political marketing process connects these strands together
with the two stages of communication and campaign; it also brings
together market intelligence, product design and communication, which
previous party models have sometimes neglected to do.
In line with this view, Strömbäck (2007) asserts that when it comes to political-
marketing,
the important question facing political parties in different countries is not
whether to conduct product-, sales- or market-oriented campaigns. The
important question is whether to be a product-, sales- or market-oriented
organization. (p. 81)
According to this perspective, then, the political marketing process is about
political parties conducting market intelligence to “identify citizen concerns,
change their behaviour to meet these demands, and communicate their ‘product
offering’ more effectively” to the electorate (Lees-Marshment, 2001a, p. 692). At
issue here is whether and/or how market intelligence is used by political parties
to inform the design and implementation of political products.
While mainstream marketing offers a framework for understanding voter and
political party behaviour, there is a need for caution when assessing its direct
applicability to the political domain. Lock and Harris (1996), for example, iden-
tify a number of important differences between conventional purchase choice and
electoral choice settings that highlight discrepancies between marketing in com-
mercial and political domains. These differences relate to:
• Costs—There is no price directly or indirectly attached to voting.
Therefore, budgetary constraints do not prevent the casting of votes;
• Benefits—Individual voters have to live with the decision of the col-
lective, even though that decision may not reflect one’s individual
preference;
• The intangibility of the political product; and
• The distinction between public choice issues and consumer mar-
kets—electoral choice and conventional purchase are affected by
different standards, timings, and consequences.
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In addition, directly equating voters/citizens with consumers is a dubious
proposition. Scammell (1999), for example, notes that equating voters with con-
sumers automatically portrays them as being passive when this not necessarily
the case. Likewise, O’Shaughnessy (2001) warns that “reliance on commercially
derived political marketing techniques to win elections helps undermine the role
of active participation in politics today, to the future detriment of those who
employ them” (p. 1052).
Despite these concerns, the development of benchmarking tools and analyti-
cal models has been a driving force underlying much political marketing research
that is aimed at assessing the effects of marketing in politics (Bartle & Griffiths,
2002). For example, Newman’s (1994) study of the ways in which presidential
candidates are marketed to voters in the United States brought together market-
ing and political campaign concepts to create a model that integrates the market-
ing campaign, the political campaign, candidate focus, and environmental forces
into a political marketing model. He postulated that the exchange process in pol-
itics was rooted in “a candidate, who offers political leadership in exchange for a
vote from the citizen” (Newman, 1994, p. 10).
Figure 1: The Lees-Marshment framework
Source: Lilleker & Lees-Marshment (2005a, p. 8).
According to Newman, successfully completing this exchange required polit-
ical organizations to simultaneously coordinate a marketing and political cam-
paign. While he viewed the “marketing campaign” as manifest throughout the
“political campaign,” he did not specify which dimension of the marketing cam-
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paign (e.g., voter segmentation, candidate positioning, strategy formulation, and
implementation) corresponds to each stage of a political campaign, or whether
any one dimension is more influential than the others.
Although Newman’s model offered an important contribution to understand-
ing how marketing techniques and concepts are and can be applied to politics, it
did not address the issue of market orientation. Lees-Marshment (2001a, 2001b)
and Lilleker & Lees-Marshment (2005a), on the other hand, have set out a politi-
cal marketing framework that distinguishes between three—ideal-type—cate-
gories of market orientation as a basis for investigating the evolution of political
parties’ orientation toward the electorate (see Figure 1). Each of the categories is
defined by a series of marketing stages that are undertaken to interact with voters.
The three categories of market orientation are as follows:
1. Product-Oriented Party (POP): Political parties falling into this cate-
gory are characterized as being strongly tied to specific convictions that
they stand by and argue for. POPs do not actively gather or use market
intelligence in the design or communication of their product offering.
The underlying assumption guiding the overall marketing strategy of
POPs is that voters will recognize the merit of the party’s ideas and,
therefore, will vote for it. In other words, POPs lobby for voter support
on the grounds that the ideology they represent is normatively valuable
and/or is the correct way of proceeding. Moreover, they adhere to their
product offering even if it fails to garner widespread support.
2. Sales-Oriented Party (SOP): Political parties falling into this category
are characterized as seeking to persuade voters of the value of their prod-
uct offerings through the gathering and use of extensive communication-
related market intelligence that is founded on an understanding of how
markets can be manipulated. The emphasis here is on research for adver-
tising and message design (i.e., product presentation), but not on the
design of the party’s product offering per se. As such, SOPs parallel
POPs insofar as they do not significantly change or alter their ideas/plat-
forms to suit what people want. They differ from POPs, however, in
terms of using market intelligence to determine how to persuade voters
that they want the product offering the party is selling.
3. Market-Oriented Party (MOP): Political parties falling into this cate-
gory are characterized as actively engaging in attempts to identify and to
incorporate voters’ priorities and concerns into their product offerings
before actually designing these offerings. The essence of the MOP strat-
egy rests on using “various tools to understand and then respond to voter
demands, but in a way that integrates the need to attend to members’
needs, ideas from politicians and experts and the realities of governing,
and to focus more on delivering and making a difference than employing
sales techniques to persuade or manipulate opinion” (Lees-Marshment,
2006, p. 122). As shown in Figure 1, the marketing strategy of MOPs
involves eight distinct stages and is much more complex than that used
by POPs and SOPs. Throughout each of these stages market intelligence
Paré & Berger / Political Marking Canadian Style? 45
is used to inform and to define the demands that will be used to build and
communicate an MOP’s product offering to voters.
With the exception of Marland (2003, 2005a, 2005b), there have been rela-
tively few studies examining the strategies of Canadian political parties through
a marketing lens. Marland (2003) illustrated the ways in which marketing tools
and techniques (e.g., comparative advertising, direct mail, Internet campaigning,
robo-calls) are implemented and used in the Canadian electoral environment. He
argues that in spite of the growing use of political consultants, Canadian federal
election campaign activities “are relatively static,” with spin control, advertising,
broadcasted debates, media relations, and party leaders’ tours being the pivotal
electoral campaign activities (Marland, 2003, p. 7). Nonetheless, Marland claims
that political marketing—in the Lees-Marshment sense of the term—is an
increasingly common phenomenon within the Canadian political context and is
directly proportional to the change in Canadian parties’ orientation toward the
electorate.
Building on his earlier work, Marland’s (2005a, 2005b) studies of the 2000
and 2004 Canadian federal elections revealed that the characteristic features of
Marketing-Oriented Parties (MOPs) were not widely identifiable among Canadian
political parties during either campaign, and that the market intelligence gathered
by the parties was not strongly embedded into their core strategies. His findings
show that with the exception of the Bloc Québécois, which adopted a Product-
Oriented (POP) approach, the characteristics of Sales-Oriented Parties (SOPs)
were the most prevalent during both campaigns, with marketing techniques being
“used predominantly for communications (rather than product) decisions”
(Marland, 2005a, p. 63).5 This suggests that instead of using marketing intelli-
gence to identify voter needs and to design party platforms (i.e., being market-ori-
ented), the marketing efforts of Canadian political parties during these campaigns
focused mainly on selling or persuading voters of the value of the respective prod-
ucts they had on offer (i.e., being selling-oriented).
The next section assesses how, and the extent to which, the Conservative
Party may be characterized as having moved toward adopting and implementing
a market-oriented approach for engaging with the Canadian electorate in the lead-
up to and during the 2006 federal election.
The 2006 Canadian federal election
For our purposes, two salient features characterize the outcome of the 2006 fed-
eral election. First, the Conservative Party was led to victory by Stephen Harper,
the same individual who had led the party during its 2004 election defeat. Second,
the Liberals lost the election despite having entered the 2006 campaign with a
commanding lead in the polls (Clarke et al., 2006; Nodice, 2007).
A central communication question that arises is How did the Conservative
Party strategy influence the shift in voter preference during the 2006 Canadian
federal election? In order to address this issue, the discussion presented in this
section is structured in accordance with the eight marketing stages that character-
ize MOPs. Our objective here is twofold. First, we aim to profile the marketing
activities of the CPC to identify whether and/or the extent to which it may be seen
as having followed the marketing stages characteristic of MOP strategy between
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the 2004 and 2006 federal elections. The second objective is to assess the efficacy
of the Lees-Marshment framework within the Canadian political context.
Stage 1: Market intelligence
According to the Lees-Marshment framework, the first stage in the market-ori-
ented approach is characterized by the gathering and analyzing of market intelli-
gence to inform internal (e.g., a common agreement in a less right-wing policy
platform) and external (e.g., policy communication, image, and party advertising)
changes in party behaviour. It is standard practice in political parties, and has
been for many years, that campaign materials are evaluated by members of the
voting public through public opinion research and focus groups that test the
appeal of draft messages and products. What distinguishes product-, sales-, and
marketing-oriented parties is if, when, and how the information gathered from
this process is used in the design and implementation of political products.
As was noted in the previous section, POPs tend to make little use of market
intelligence in designing their product offerings. SOPs, on the other hand, make
extensive use of market intelligence for the purposes of product presentation as
opposed to the actual design of their product offerings. For MOPs, however, the
gathering and analysis of market intelligence “aims to discover voter’s behaviour,
needs, wants, and priorities” and to understand public concerns and demands
before attempting to design a product offering that reflects these interests
(Lilleker & Lees-Marshment, 2005a, p. 10). The distinguishing feature of MOPs,
then, is that unlike POPs and SOPs, their use of market intelligence is seen to
extend to virtually all aspects of product design and implementation.
Given the newness of the Conservative Party at the time of the 2004 election,
it had not yet established a unified voice or developed a coordinated policy plat-
form before Canadians went to the polls (Cross, 2007; Cross & Young, 2003).
Instead, the party was characterized by a makeshift amalgamation of Canadian
Alliance–Reform and Progressive Conservative cultures. Among other things,
this allowed the Liberals to portray the new party and its leader as being inca-
pable of running an efficient government and of holding a right-wing “hidden
agenda” (Clarke et al., 2005; Rose, 2004).
In the aftermath of its 2004 election defeat, the Conservative Party began a
process of reconstruction (Ellis & Woolstencroft, 2006; Marzolini, 2006). The
bulk of the Conservative Party’s work in this domain consisted of the gathering
and analysis of market intelligence6 to inform the development of a policy plat-
form that sought to reflect the concerns and priorities of specific segments of the
electorate (e.g., soft conservatives and soft liberals), re-branding the party as a
viable centrist option that was more accountable than the Liberals, improving the
party’s media management strategies, and fostering the participation of promi-
nent MPs in the party leader’s national campaign. Elaborating on this process,
one senior-level communications advisor for the Conservative Party com-
mented:
The Conservative Party spent a lot of time between the loss in 2004 and
the election in 2006 branding itself. There were a number of things that
happened. They brought on a fellow named Patrick Muttart who came
from the private marketing, private opinion world. He did a lot of
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research and work looking at patterns of voters and trends, and what
worked and what didn’t work at many levels. (Personal communication,
June 15, 2006).
These activities informed the Conservatives’ efforts at updating, defining, and
communicating a more unified product offering to the Canadian voting public in
the 2006 election than had been the case in 2004. In the words of Stephen Harper,
“We had a complete review of what we did, what we did right or wrong and then
made the appropriate changes” (quoted in Persichilli, 2006).
Although the “newness” of the Conservatives’ product offering was criticized
by some as reflecting little more than a superficial modification of the policy plat-
forms of the former Canadian Alliance and Progressive Conservative parties, the
basic MOP approach of responding to the electorate by implementing market-ori-
ented changes appears to have been adopted by the Conservative Party and its
leader during the 18 months between the 38th and 39th federal elections.
Stage 2: Product design, and Stage 3: Product adjustment
The Lees-Marshment framework suggests that one can distinguish between the
design of a political party’s product offering (e.g., party platform, party and leader
image) on the one hand and product adjustments on the other. According to this
framework, MOPs design and, subsequently, adjust their product offering on the
basis of market intelligence data. This can entail making changes to almost any
aspect of the party’s product offering, ranging from the trivial to the very specific.
Product adjustments, in turn, are seen to be influenced by four core variables: 
Achievability—parties should not promise what they cannot deliver, as
this results in voter dissatisfaction.
Internal reaction analysis—at issue here is the linking of the demands
and priorities of the market with those of party members. MOPs have to
strike a balance between the demands and priorities of voters and those
of party members.
Competition analysis—the distinctiveness of the product design is a con-
sequence of analyzing and responding to what other political parties are
offering to voters.
Support analysis—this aspect of product adjustment involves identifying
the key groups or segments within the market whose support is required
to achieve party goals (e.g., electoral victory, winning a certain number
of seats) and developing targeted aspects of the product to suit them.
While distinguishing between product design and product adjustment as
unique phases in the political marketing process may provide analytical clarity, it
potentially blurs realities on the ground in different institutional and cultural con-
texts insofar as it overlooks the fact that the two processes may actually be inter-
dependent (Lees, 2005; Rudd, 2005, Strömbäck, 2007). For example, within the
Canadian political context it would be extremely difficult to design a political
product that did not correspond in some way with a political party’s core beliefs
and values and which was not influenced by feedback from the public as well as
comparative analyses of what other political parties were offering to voters. In
48 Canadian Journal of Communication, Vol 33 (1)
other words, political parties in Canada need to adhere, at least nominally, to
some form of ideological constraint in order to help voters/citizens understand
what individual parties stand for.7 As one senior-level Liberal Party communica-
tions advisor put it, “As cynical as people are about this, the parties do come from
shared values, they do come from core beliefs, of policies that they espouse, and
those things. . . they don’t move a lot” (personal communication, June 12, 2006).
The election of a Liberal minority government in 2004 led to uncertainty
about the timing of the next federal election and meant that the Conservatives had
to contend with a major dilemma in the post-election period. Ellis &
Woolstencroft (2006, p. 58) aptly summarize this predicament as follows:
How then, would the Conservative Party address its identity crisis in
attempting to broaden its support? How would it position itself on social
issues like abortion, same sex marriage, and euthanasia? Could it suc-
cessfully navigate the troubled waters of French-English relations? What
role would it prescribe for the courts, especially in relation to the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms? What was its vision of federalism, the role of
government, and the welfare state? In the fashion of a missionary move-
ment, would it revert to the populist, moralistic, and right-wing rhetoric
of the Reform Party, one of its founders? Or would it develop more mod-
erate and balanced positions in the manner of a broker-oriented, centre-
seeking party, akin to the Progressive Conservative Party, the other part
of its heritage?
In March 2005, more than one year after the party had been formed, the
Conservatives held their first national policy convention, in Montréal. The meet-
ing culminated with the release of the Conservative Party of Canada’s 2005
Policy Declaration. Although the declaration had Reform–Alliance overtones,
the bulk of its contents “effectively eliminated most of the social, conservative
and populist hot-button issues that allowed their opponents to label the
Conservatives as extreme and accuse them of harbouring hidden agendas” (Ellis
& Woolstencroft, 2006, p. 65). Some of the key changes away from the previous
Reform–Alliance positions included support for not re-engaging in the abortion
debate, allowing free votes in Parliament on moral issues such as euthanasia and
same-sex marriage, and addressing the fiscal imbalance.
The convention proceedings and the resultant policy declaration suggest that
the CPC’s shift toward becoming a pragmatic centre-right party was accepted
internally, even by those members with more social conservative agendas. The
unifying factor in this instance appears to have been a recognition of the impor-
tance of party unity and a desire to take the steps needed to be recognized by vot-
ers as a viable option to form the next government (Ellis, 2006; Ellis &
Woolstencroft, 2006).
In addition to moving toward a more centrist position, the Conservatives
were cognizant of the need to effectively communicate their new policy platform
to voters. Here too market intelligence was used. First, the Conservatives ana-
lyzed the demographics of the core supporters who were the target audience for
its product offerings (i.e., support analysis). This enabled the party to avoid
expending efforts on seeking to attract voters who were deemed to be unattain-
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able while maximizing its appeal to those who were seen to be its most receptive
audience. Put simply, market intelligence was used to help develop a “campaign
that could ‘narrowcast’ rather than ‘broadcast’” (Marzolini, 2006, p. 258).
Second, whereas the policy platform for the 2004 election had been overly
detailed and not well aligned with the party’s communication and advertising
strategies, the Montréal policy declaration was structured around five valence
issues, or themes, that the party’s market intelligence–gathering exercises had
identified as being of particular importance to Canadian voters—i.e., political
accountability, health care, crime/security, tax relief, and child care. Indeed, four
of these issues were subsequently identified by the 2006 Political Support in
Canada pre-election online survey of 6,116 Canadians as being the most impor-
tant issues in the 2006 election (see Figure 2). The Liberals, by contrast, entered
the 2006 campaign hoping that voters would be primarily concerned with eco-
nomic issues (Clarke et al., 2006; Clarkson, 2006).
Figure 2: Issues identified as most important in the 2006 federal election
Source: Adapted from Clarke et al. (2006, p. 817).
Each of the five valence issues prioritized by the Conservatives were, in turn,
linked to specific policies that had “the virtue of being hands-on, personally iden-
tifiable, and good for consumers rather than for corporations, public policy spe-
cialists, or newspaper editorialists” (Ellis & Woolstencroft, 2006, p. 72). In other
words, the structuring of a policy platform on the basis of five valence issues that
the party’s market intelligence–gathering exercises had identified as being prior-
ity areas for voters enabled the Conservatives to put forth a distinguishable pol-
icy platform that was easy to communicate and understand. The platform also
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appears to have struck a balance between the demands and priorities of its target
audience and those of party members.
Stephen Harper’s leadership image also underwent a major transformation in
the period between the 2004 and 2006 elections. For the Conservatives, leader-
ship image was particularly important given that the Liberals had so successfully
portrayed Harper as a “scary” individual with a hidden right-wing agenda during
the 2004 election (Rose, 2004, 2006). A particularly significant feature of
Stephen Harper’s and the Conservatives’ image transformation was the effort
made at re-branding the leader and the party in Québec, where in 2004 they had
failed to win any seats. This re-branding process was closely tied to the Liberal
sponsorship scandal and the subsequent Gomery Commission that had Québec at
its epicentre. In light of these events, the Conservatives managed to seize upon
and reinforce popular dissatisfaction with the Liberals in Québec by giving
greater precedence to the Québec electorate’s concerns and by working toward
improving Harper’s French-language skills. This is reflected in the observations
of O’Neill (2006), who notes that “Mr. Harper began to catch on in Quebec after
delivering a speech in Quebec City in which he promised ‘open federalism’ that
would honour provincial autonomy, work to reduce the fiscal imbalance and
allow Quebec and other provinces a greater role on the international stage.”
These efforts by the Conservatives in the lead-up to, and during, the 2006
election campaign appear to have successfully re-branded Stephen Harper’s lead-
ership image into a new “nice guy,” “friendly” image. Commenting on this new
image, Sallot (2006) noted:
Mr. Harper successfully portrayed himself and his party as the folks
down the block, hockey dads, soccer moms, moderate small-c conserva-
tives, middle class, slightly bland, definitely not scary. The makeover
was so successful that many voters decided to trust the Conservatives to
form a government.
The processes of product design and adjustment undertaken by the
Conservatives also suggest a partial shift toward an MOP approach. To this end,
the use of market intelligence to inform the design and adjustment of a product
offering appears to have been an essential component in shaping the
Conservatives’ policy platform in the lead-up to the 2006 campaign. The infor-
mation gathered contributed to the repositioning of the Conservative Party toward
a more centrist agenda and the re-branding of Stephen Harper’s leadership image
in English- and French-speaking Canada. Taken together, these two factors
appear to have coalesced to create a more comprehensive and cohesive product
offering than had been the case in 2004.
Stage 4: Implementation
Equally important and related to the development of a product offering in any
marketing effort is the process of product implementation. As Lilleker & Lees-
Marshment (2005a, p. 11) point out, in the political domain this process “involves
unifying the party around the proposed product.” This suggests that the variables
influencing the product adjustment stage (e.g., achievability, internal reaction
analysis, competition analysis, support analysis) also are likely to manifest them-
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selves throughout the implementation stage because they are central to maintain-
ing and/or fostering party cohesiveness.
Party cohesiveness is essential to convincing voters of the credibility of the
product offering, because the failure of party members to engage in a common dis-
course can create internal problems that risk contaminating the party’s brand. This
points to the importance of striking a balance between the demands and priorities
of the targeted audience and those of party members throughout the implementa-
tion stages. Moreover, the specificities of the Canadian political environment (i.e.,
geography, bilingualism, and the parliamentary system) call for strong party har-
mony and internal organization to ensure the effective communication and diffu-
sion of political parties’ product offerings throughout the country’s diverse
constituencies.
According to Flanagan (2006), a senior Conservative campaign advisor for
the 2006 election, Stephen Harper was keenly aware of the importance of party
unity. Commenting on Harper’s recognition of the difference between a party of
government and a party of influence, Flanagan writes:
Both Reform and the NDP have been famous for their outspoken mem-
bers, who never hesitate to challenge the conventional wisdom, official
party policy and even their leader. From the beginning Harper under-
stood that that style would never succeed for a governing party in a par-
liamentary system, so he has worked to establish discipline and control,
both internally over staff, caucus and cabinet and externally over media
relations. (Flanagan, 2006, p. 83)
The adoption of a more cohesive and disciplined approach to delivering the
party’s message after the 2005 Montréal convention marked a substantive differ-
ence from the communication processes that had characterized the Conservatives’
actions throughout the 2004 campaign. This change appears to have enabled
Conservative electoral candidates to more effectively focus on the main elements
of the party’s platform and to communicate similar messages to their constituen-
cies prior to and throughout the 2006 election campaign. By contrast, during the
2004 campaign the Conservatives had problems with candidates going off mes-
sage. For example, the accusations made by some candidates that prime minister
Paul Martin was soft on child pornography along with the voicing of other inflam-
matory and socially conservative messages served to detract attention from the
Conservatives’ message. It also provided fodder for the Liberals’ claims that
Harper was not trustworthy (Clarke et al., 2005; Clarke et al., 2006; Ellis &
Woolstencroft, 2006).
Gaining sufficient credibility among the electorate to be seen as a viable
option to form the government was one of the Conservative Party’s greatest chal-
lenges in the lead-up to the 2006 election. This activity is a particularly important
facet of the MOP approach, because it is “only when an overall majority of the
party members, candidates and MPs broadly accept the logic of the market-ori-
ented product will voters be convinced of the credibility of what the party has on
offer” (Lilleker & Lees-Marshment, 2005a, p. 11). The Conservatives appear to
have succeeded in gaining this credibility, in large part, due to a combination of
factors, some of which were not under their control.
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In terms of credibility enhancing factors beyond the party’s control, the
Conservatives benefited from a number of extenuating circumstances that con-
tributed to a shift in public opinion to the Conservatives by raising questions about
the Liberals’ credibility and track record as the party in government. First, the
release of the Gomery Commission Report in early November 2005 ensured that the
Liberal sponsorship scandal would once again be a focal election issue. Although
the report’s findings concluded that Prime Minister Paul Martin had not personally
engaged in any wrongdoing, the revelations regarding the scope of irregularities
and mismanagement of the sponsorship program identified a “culture of entitle-
ment” among prominent Liberals and bureaucrats involved with the program.
Further doubts were raised about the accountability of the Liberals in
December 2006, in the middle of the 2006 election campaign, with the announce-
ment of an RCMP criminal investigation into suspicious trading patterns on the
Toronto Stock Exchange in the hours preceding an announcement by the Liberal
finance minister, Ralph Goodale, on November 23, 2005, that there would be no
change in the tax rules governing income trust investments. Combined with the
Gomery findings, the income trust affair served to reinforce the notion that there
was serious corruption within the Liberal ranks.
A third noteworthy event from which the Conservatives appear to have bene-
fited serendipitously was the “beer and popcorn” comments made by Scott Reid, the
Liberals’ director of communications, on CBC Television during a panel discussion
in the early stages of the election campaign. Responding to the Conservatives’ plan
to give families with young children $1,200 a year for child care, Reid said, “Don’t
give people 25 bucks a week to blow on beer and popcorn. . . . Give them child-care
spaces that work” (quoted in “Liberal Apologizes,” CBC, 2005). Shortly after mak-
ing these comments, Reid was forced to issue a public apology. Taken together, the
three issues outlined above contributed to a shift in public opinion toward the
Conservatives insofar as they helped to crystallize the doubts and suspicions of the
public over the lack of Liberal accountability.
As for the credibility enhancing factors over which the Conservatives did
have control, there are three that are notable from a marketing perspective. The
first centres on the success of the Conservative Party in designing specific poli-
cies that focused on valence issues that reflected the concerns and priorities of
particular segments of the electorate (i.e., soft Conservatives and soft Liberals)
and which did not significantly deviate from the party’s principles. Second, cau-
cus members managed to stay on message throughout the 2006 campaign.
“[D]ivisive position issues such as abortion, immigration, and same-sex marriage
were sidestepped, and party ideologues were tightly muzzled” (Clarke et al.,
2006, p. 819). The third key factor was the Conservatives’ media strategy. It is
discussed in more detail below.
Stage 5: Communication, and Stage 6: Campaign
Stage 5 of the Lees-Marshment framework, Communication, centres on convey-
ing a political party’s product offering to the electorate. This stage is seen to
reflect a continuous process that facilitates interactions between internal and
external supporters of the party in a coherent manner during election and non-
election periods. It is followed by the Campaign, which re-iterates and empha-
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sizes the most relevant aspects of the product offering for voters before they go
to the polls.
A party’s media strategy is a central component of the campaign stage and
constitutes an important part of an MOP’s overall market orientation insofar as it
is indicative of the way in which the party seeks to frame itself as speaking on
behalf of citizens. Successfully managing this framing exercise by being market
oriented is particularly crucial for political parties that have to contend with com-
mercialized and/or competitive media systems, because doing so “can make it
more difficult for journalists to criticize them and to focus on aspects of the cam-
paigns other than those issues the parties feel are important” (Strömbäck, 2007,
p. 85; see also Knuckey & Lees-Marshment, 2005; Waddell & Dornan, 2006).
Historically, within the Canadian political context most political advertising
was confined to the short time frames of election campaigns. This, however,
began to change in the late 1980s, when indirect campaigning began to take
place outside of election periods. At issue here are the strategic manoeuvres
made by a party in government that are aimed at putting it on an election foot-
ing and improving its re-election prospects before an election is called (e.g.,
budget speeches, cabinet shuffles, party conferences). Labelling this phenome-
non “the long campaign,” Clarke et al. (1996) point out that while these types of
activities easily merge with the day-to-day activities of government and tend to
be less direct than the actions taken by parties during campaigns to engage the
attention of the electorate, they are nonetheless aimed at affecting election out-
comes. We have chosen to conflate the communication and campaign stages of
the MOP approach into one, given their interconnectedness within the Canadian
political context.
According to Lilleker & Lees-Marshment (2005a), if a party has recently
changed its product offering, the communication stage is crucial for convincing
voters that its offer is truly suitable to people’s interests. The Conservatives’
communication strategy throughout the 2006 election campaign appears to
have successfully tackled this issue. A more strategic understanding of the news
cycle and of how the party might best communicate its product offering accord-
ingly was a defining characteristic of the Conservative communication strategy
during this period (Clarke et al., 2006; Ellis & Woolstencroft, 2006; Waddell &
Dornan, 2006).
The Conservative Party’s communication and campaign strategies were
rooted in the notion that it was the party’s overall product offering that constituted
its principal strength. This meant that the Conservative Party had to ensure that
the diffusion of its messages was clearly directed toward voters, and furthermore
that its messages were structured concisely, that they were easy to understand,
and that they were communicated as efficiently as possible. Patrick Muttart8
played an important role in this regard, especially in terms of designing how and
what messages were conveyed to the public. In the words of Ellis &
Woolstencroft (2006, p. 71), “he was responsible for giving the campaign a nar-
rative that pulled together the often disjointed aspects of abstract policy, advertis-
ing and messaging by providing a new style that reflected the party’s more
moderate identity.” Fostering and maintaining this moderate image also included
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the strategic decision of not “going negative” in the first weeks of the 2006 cam-
paign, despite the accusations of corruption associated with the Liberal sponsor-
ship scandal and, later, the income trust investigation.
The strategic decision to convey one policy announcement per day was
another key feature of the Conservatives’ political communication strategy
throughout the 2006 campaign. Commenting on the differences between the
party’s 2004 and 2006 communication strategies in On Campus Weekly, Tom
Flanagan pointed out:
In 2004 we didn’t communicate our platform very effectively. We
thought we should put it out in larger chunks, so we released it more or
less a chapter a day over a two-week period. But the media, once they
have something, they’re not interested anymore, they always want some-
thing new. This time instead of a chapter a day we released a plank a day
and we kept it going for almost seven weeks. (quoted in “War Room
Insights,” 2006)
This approach had the added advantage of portraying the Conservatives as
being policy driven, and of forcing the Liberals to continually respond to the
Conservatives’ announcements rather than communicating their own proposals.
Ultimately, this tactic served as a means to “seize control of the news agenda, to
dominate the day-to-day coverage” (Waddell & Dornan, 2006, p. 222). As such,
it was first and foremost a media management technique that appears to have suc-
cessfully influenced the media coverage given to the Conservative Party. Both
Stephen Harper and the Conservative Party received considerably more positive
media coverage and public opinion support throughout the 2006 election than
Harper’s Liberal counterpart, Paul Martin.9 It seems plausible that this too played
an important role in influencing voter preferences.
Stage 7: Election
A key objective of the Conservative Party in the 18 months between the 2004 and
2006 elections was to broaden its appeal to the electorate. On January 23, 2006,
the Conservative Party was elected to power and brought to an end 12 years of
Liberal rule. Although they did not receive enough votes to form a majority gov-
ernment, the success of the Conservatives reflects a noteworthy turnaround in
voter preference in a short period of time, as is evidenced by an almost 7%
increase in their popular share of the vote when compared to the 2004 election
outcome (see Table 1).
Table 1: Vote shares by party, 2004 and 2006
Party 2004 2006
Percentage of No. of Percentage of No. of
popular vote seats popular vote seats
Conservative Party of Canada 29.6 99 36.3 124
Liberal Party of Canada 36.7 135 30.2 103
NDP 15.7 19 17.5 29
Bloc Québécois 12.4 54 10.5 51
Source: Elections Canada website: www.elections.ca.
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Lederer, Plasser, & Scheucher (2005, p. 132) claim that “politics is always
caught between leading and following the electorate.” This clearly is manifest in
the ways in which the Conservative Party re-branded itself between the two elec-
tions. As Ellis & Woolstencroft (2006, p. 87) have noted, the 2006 election, ulti-
mately, was a campaign “predicated on the belief that there was great interest in
change but only if it was moderate, balanced and circumspect.” To this end, the
strategies used by the Conservatives to identify and respond to the concerns of the
electorate and to successfully present themselves as having the capacity to deliver
such change suggest at least a partial transformation toward becoming a more
market-oriented party than had been the case in 2004.
Stage 8: Delivery
The final marketing stage for MOPs centres on the ability of the elected party to
deliver its promised product to the public while it forms the government. During
this stage the ruling political party must contend with maintaining the electorate’s
support and satisfying its demands. This stage, then, is particularly relevant for
the Conservatives given that they came to power as a minority government and
have ambitions of forming a majority government after the next federal election.
The defining feature of the Conservative Party’s product offering in the 2006
election was its short-term and personal-gain proposals (e.g., child care
allowance, cut in the GST) that were aimed at appealing directly to the demands
of voters. However, this in itself cannot ensure continued electoral appeal. The
issue with which the Conservatives must now contend is that despite an apparent
shift toward being market oriented,
in areas of economic policy, social policy, and national unity, the
Conservative proposals were attractive to some but weren’t the over-
whelming choice of voters. On the trust and competence factors, the pub-
lic did not so much trust the Tories as distrust the Liberals. On the
leadership factor, Harper’s advantage was fashioned once again in the
comparative context, against a backdrop of a Liberal leader with an
unappealing personal manner. (Pammett & Dornan, 2006, p. 21)
While in government, the Conservatives have had to form coalitions with the
other political parties to deliver on the product they promised to the Canadian
electorate. For example, the passing of the 2006 federal budget was dependent on
the support of the Bloc Québécois. For the Conservatives, the continued minimiz-
ing of uncertainty among the electorate vis-à-vis their ability to deliver will be
contingent upon the extent to which the party can successfully engage in similar
political brokerage processes without alienating its internal supporters.
The issue that arises with regard to the Conservatives’ aspirations of forming
a majority government after the next election is whether the party will be able to
sustain a market orientation while in government and convince a broader range of
voters that its product reflects and addresses their concerns and priorities.
Sustaining a market orientation is no easy task for ruling parties, because “the
business of governing may reduce the space as well as the incentive to continue to
develop fully fledged market oriented policy in all its complexity” (Lilleker &
Lees-Marshment, 2005b, p. 213). The comparative evidence regarding party
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behaviour when in government points to a tendency for market-oriented parties to
lose their connection with voters and to ebb toward becoming sales and/or prod-
uct oriented (Lees-Marshment, 2006; Lilleker & Lees-Marshment, 2005a;
Marland, 2005a; Ormrod, 2006). Put simply, it is easier for political parties to be
market oriented when they are in opposition than when they form the government.
Evaluating the effectiveness of political marketing
The consolidation of a market relation between citizens and political agents is
influencing the types of strategies being used by political parties in liberal democ-
racies to more effectively interact with and understand the desires, needs, and pri-
orities of voters/citizens. Central to these strategies has been a shift toward the
identification and implementation of new methods for responding more directly
to demands from an electorate that increasingly exerts its political power under a
consumerist mantle. Although they have not tended to respond as rapidly to these
changes as their counterparts in other countries, Canadian political parties are not
exempt from this phenomenon.
This study has employed the Lees-Marshment political marketing framework
to demonstrate and assess changes in the political strategy of the Conservative
Party of Canada in the period between the 2004 and 2006 Canadian federal elec-
tions. According to this framework, market-oriented parties, or MOPs, are
defined as seeking to obtain and understand public concerns a priori as a basis
for designing their product offering (i.e., policy platform, party and leader
image). In other words, MOPs do not “attempt to change what people think, but
to deliver what they need and want” as identified through the gathering and
analysis of market intelligence (Lilleker & Lees-Marshment, 2005a, p. 10).
The evidence from the case study suggests that this type of process can be
identified, albeit to a limited degree, in the actions of the Conservative Party in the
lead-up to, and during, the 2006 federal election campaign. Specific features of the
adoption of a market-oriented approach were reflected in the following ways:
• designing a policy platform on the basis of input from the electorate;
• disseminating campaign messages focusing on short-term actions
(e.g., cut in the GST, child-care reform, reduced health-care waiting
times) and long-term policy objectives (e.g., expansion of educational
programs for health professionals, new legislation regarding crime)
that were not dramatically different from previous governments; and
• enhancing the cohesiveness of the party’s message delivery in a man-
ner that minimized the likelihood of Conservative candidates going
off message.
Taken together, these market-oriented actions enabled the Conservative Party to
revise its product offering so as to more effectively portray itself, and to be por-
trayed in the mass media, as a party that was more accountable and, potentially,
more credible than the governing Liberals. It may be concluded, therefore, that
the Conservatives successfully managed to influence a shift in voter preference
by designing and marketing a product offering that struck a balance between the
interests of specific segments of the voting public (i.e., the desire for efficiency,
accountability, and direct benefits without a radical ideological shift) and the
interests of internal party supporters. The party’s market-oriented shift toward the
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centre of the political spectrum appears to reflect, foremost, strategic considera-
tions aimed at avoiding engagement with contentious policy considerations that
appeal directly to contending social values.
Despite its apparent shift toward a more market-oriented strategy, however,
the Conservatives only won a mandate to form a minority government. This
raises questions about the extent to which or, indeed, whether the adoption of a
market orientation can be identified as the deciding factor in the party’s 2006
election victory. Given the historical volatility of the Canadian voting public and
its lack of long-term party loyalty, it must be acknowledged that the election out-
come may have been little more than another strategic defeat for the Liberal Party
in the wake of the findings of the Gomery Commission Report, the launching of
an RCMP investigation into the income trust affair during the election campaign,
and Scott Reid’s “beer and popcorn” comments. On this note, Turcotte points out
that the Liberals have been “punished” by Canadians in the past (e.g., 1957, 1979,
1984), with voters electing Conservative governments when it was felt that the
Liberal Party “had been in power for too long and its growing arrogance needed
to be kept in check,” (2006, p. 300).
Although the Lees-Marshment framework was originally developed as an
analytical tool for examining party behaviour in a different national setting (i.e.,
the United Kingdom), it provides a useful framework for understanding and
assessing party strategy within the Canadian political environment. There are,
however, some noteworthy limitations that need to be addressed. First, and as was
highlighted in the case study, some of the stages identified in the framework are
not as distinguishable within the Canadian context as the framework suggests.
Specifically, the distinctions between the Product Design and Product Adjustment
stages and the Communication and Campaign stages do not appear to hold given
the electoral constraints arising from advertising regulations and campaign tim-
ing in Canada. It is important to note, however, that while the stages themselves
are not as distinguishable as the framework posits, the defining features of these
stages are identifiable. This finding serves to reinforce the claim that some of the
processes associated with individual marketing stages may in certain institutional
and cultural contexts be interdependent. As Marland has noted, this raises some
concerns about the framework’s efficacy because “being fully marketing oriented
is difficult. . . failing at just one or two marketing stages disqualifies a party from
being an MOP,” (2005a, p. 72).
A second, and related, concern that also has been noted by Marland (2005a),
Rudd (2005), Lees (2005), and Strömbäck (2007), is the potential for the Lees-
Marshment framework to underestimate the complexity and dynamism of the
political sphere. Put simply, the adoption and implementation of market-oriented
strategies is not a panacea that ensures electoral victory. As the experience of the
Conservatives in the 2006 federal election makes clear, other critical factors, such
as voter volatility, cultural constraints, and political history, can be expected to
exert a major influence over voter behaviour.
Third, and perhaps most problematic from a normative perspective, the Lees-
Marshment framework provides little to no basis for assessing the democratic
implications of political parties adopting a market orientation. Within the context
of the current study, for example, it is far from clear whether the election outcome
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means that the electorate is getting what it needs and wants as a result of the
Conservatives having apparently become more market oriented or whether this
change in party behaviour reflects, foremost, a strategy aimed at enabling the
party to get what it needs and wants.
Within the Canadian context it seems plausible that the continued empower-
ment of voters as political consumers is likely to influence the ways in which
other political parties will present their product offerings in the coming years.
Two areas beckoning for empirically grounded research in this regard centre on:
(i) how Web-based platforms such as Facebook and YouTube are influencing the
political marketing and branding strategies of Canadian political parties; and (ii)
the ways in which gender-based considerations are being developed and incorpo-
rated into the political marketing and branding strategies of Canadian political
parties. With another federal election on the horizon, evaluating the effectiveness
of political marketing as a means for addressing voter demands and investigating
the ways in which marketing strategies are integrated into the Canadian politic
context are likely to remain at the forefront of ongoing research into the dynam-
ics of Canadian political communication.
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Notes
1. For a concise overview of the key issues at stake in the 2004 Canadian federal election, see
Clarke, Kornberg, MacLeod, and Scotto (2005).
2. See Lilleker & Lees-Marshment (2005a) and Strömbäck (2007).
3. Indeed, it is only since the 1993 federal election, which was marked by the beginning of the
demise of the Progressive Conservative Party and the rise to prominence of the Bloc Québécois
and the Reform parties, that Canada has taken on the strong appearance of a multi-party system.
Previously, the Canadian political landscape had been characterized by one-party dominance with
alternate periods of what was, essentially, a two-party system (Carty, Cross, & Young, 2001;
Dyck, 2003).
4. Valence issues are issues that are not framed on an adversarial basis and that tend to foster polit-
ical debate that “focuses on which party has the best solution to the problem or, more frequently,
which party leader can most competently deal with it” (Clarke et al., 1996, p. 110). Examples
include issues such as supplying affordable health care, fostering a healthy economy, ensuring
political accountability.
5. Much of the advertising during the 2000 campaign consisted of negative/attack ads. This type of
advertising also became a key feature of the late stages of the 2004 campaign.
6. Another important source of strategic information was informal consultations with the team
behind the successful 2004 election campaign of the Conservative Australian prime minister John
Howard. See Laghi (2006).
7. At issue here the distinction between political parties being market driven versus market oriented.
In the case of the former, internal, competition, and support analyses may not take place as par-
ties begin to implement changes. Consequently, market-driven parties risk alienating their tradi-
tional supporters, are more likely to adopt policies that parallel those of their competition, and
may fail to clearly delineate what they stand for ideologically. Lees-Marshment & Lilleker (2001)
and Lilleker (2005) argue that the U.K. Labour Party under the leadership of Tony Blair exempli-
fied a market-driven political party that managed to design a product offering that did not corre-
spond with party beliefs.
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8. Patrick Muttart is a communications consultant who was employed by Navigator Ltd., a Toronto-
based research and strategy firm, before being recruited by Stephen Harper. In the 2006 federal
election campaign, he worked in the war room as a senior strategist and communications special-
ist. After the Conservatives’ victory, he was appointed Stephen Harper’s chief of staff.
9. According to the findings of a study examining the tones of news coverage during the 2006 elec-
tion, carried out by the Observatory of Media and Public Policy (OMPP) at McGill University,
the Conservative Party ended the campaign with a Net Tone of 1% versus a -13% Net Tone of the
Liberals. According to the OMPP methodology, the “Net tone” is measured by, first, coding the
tone (positive, negative, neutral) for every mention of a party or leader in the stories of the news-
papers the study coded; and, second, taking the percentage of party/leader mentions that are pos-
itive and subtracting the percentage of party/leader mentions that are negative. The measure runs
from -100% (all party/leader mentions are negative) to +100% (all party/leader mentions are pos-
itive). See Blake, Maioni, and Soroka (2006) and http://media-observatory.mcgill.ca/pages/
reports/OMPPElection2006(06-01-22).pdf.
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